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Workers' Compensation and Injury Duration: 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment 
By BRUCE D. MEYER, W. KIP VISCUSI, AND DAVID L. DURBIN* 
This paper examines the effect of workers' compensation on time out of work. It 
introduces a "natural experiment" approach of comparing individuals injured 
before and after increases in the maximum weekly benefit amount. The increases 
examined in Kentucky and Michigan raised the benefit amount for high-earnings 
individuals by approximately 50 percent, while low-earnings individuals, who 
were unaffected by the benefit maximum, did not experience a change in their 
incentives. Time out of work increased for those eligible for the higher benefits 
and remained unchanged for those whose benefits were constant. The estimated 
duration elasticities are clustered around 0.3-0.4. (JEL C90, H51, J28) 
Workers' compensation can influence the 
incentives workers face in several ways. 
Higher benefit rates may decrease workers' 
incentives to avoid injuries, may increase 
the incentives to file for compensation for 
any given job injury, and may foster more 
claims for nonwork injuries. In addition, 
higher benefits may make extending the du- 
ration of a claim more attractive. Most pre- 
vious work on incentive effects of workers' 
compensation has focused on the program's 
effect on injury rates or the number of claims 
rather than the duration of claims.1 
This emphasis may have led to an under- 
estimation of the extent of the effect of 
workers' compensation on incentives. 
Higher benefits might induce workers to 
stay out of work longer either to complete 
medical recovery or to have more leisure.2 
Such changes may occur even if care and 
injury levels on the job are unaffected by 
workers' compensation. In this paper, we 
address one aspect of the incentives created 
by workers' compensation using data from a 
natural experiment provided by two large 
increases in benefit levels in Kentucky and 
Michigan. This natural experiment enables 
us to compare the behavior of people who 
are injured before the benefit increases to 
those injured after the increases, providing 
a test of the effect of benefit changes on the 
duration of claims. 
The motivation for our approach is the 
observation that, within a given state at a 
point in time, the weekly benefit for tempo- 
rary total disability is a piecewise linear 
increasing function of previous earnings. 
Since previous earnings strongly influence 
the payoff from returning to work, the eco- 
nomic benefits of returning to work and the 
economic gains from receiving benefits are 
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tion Insurance, Hoboken, NJ 07030-5722. We thank 
Joe Altonji, Tom Downes, Bo Honor6, Rob Fairlie, 
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FIGURE 1. TEMPORARY TOTAL BENEFIT SCHEDULE 
BEFORE AND AFTER AN INCREASE IN 
THE MAXIMUM WEEKLY BENEFIT 
each largely influenced by a common vari- 
able, previous earnings. Regressions of spell 
length on weekly benefits and previous 
earnings consequently cannot easily distin- 
guish between the effect of workers' com- 
pensation and the highly correlated influ- 
ence of previous earnings. This result is 
especially true if we are uncertain about 
exactly how previous earnings affect spell 
length.3 
The main idea behind our solution to this 
problem can be seen in Figure 1, which 
displays a typical state schedule relating the 
weekly benefit amount (WBA) for tempo- 
rary total disability4 to previous weekly 
earnings. The solid line is the schedule prior 
to a change in the state law that raises the 
maximum weekly benefit amount. The 
dashed line is the schedule after the benefit 
increase. For people with previous earnings 
of at least E3 (the high-earnings group), we 
compare the weeks of benefits received for 
people injured during the year before and 
the year after the change in the benefit 
schedule. Those whose claims began before 
the increase receive WBA'max while those 
injured afterwards receive WBA'max, This 
group of workers consequently experiences 
the full effect of the benefit increase. An 
individual's injury date determines his tem- 
porary total disability benefit amount for 
the entire period of the disability.5 For ex- 
ample, two individuals with previous earn- 
ings greater than E2 will receive different 
weekly benefit amounts for up to several 
years, if one was injured a few days before 
and the other a few days after the effective 
date of the benefit increase. The effect of 
this difference is the basis of the empirical 
test used in the paper. Most of the remain- 
ing methodological problems involve cor- 
recting for possible differences between the 
individuals who are injured before and after 
the benefit increase. In much of what fol- 
lows, we will use as a comparison group 
those with earnings between E1 and E2 (the 
low-earnings group) who are injured during 
the year before and after the benefit in- 
crease. The benefits these individuals re- 
ceive are unaffected by the increase in the 
maximum weekly benefit. 
Section I briefly outlines the structure of 
workers' compensation and describes the 
benefit changes in Kentucky and Michigan 
that provide the basis for this paper. In 
Section II we describe the data and outline 
the empirical procedure used to relate the 
policy shifts to the incentive effects. The 
two modes of analysis, assessment of mean 
effects resulting from the policy shifts and 
regression analysis of durations, appear in 
Sections III and IV. By comparing changes 
in duration and changes in medical expendi- 
tures we are also able to distinguish the 
spell-duration effect of higher benefits from 
the effect of changes in injury severity. Sec- 
tion IV also reports more precise estimates 
using all of the available data without mak- 3This identification problem created by the depen- 
dence of program generosity on an individual's previ- 
ous earnings is common to many social insurance pro- 
grams. See Meyer (1989) for a parallel paper on unem- 
ployment insurance that builds on earlier work by 
Kathleen P. Classen (1979) and Gary Solon (1985). 
4Temporary total disabilities are those where the 
employee is unable to work but is expected to recover 
fully and return to work. The types of benefits are 
discussed in more detail in Section I. 
5Some states have cost-of-living adjustments which 
index the benefit for inflation. The two states examined 
here, Kentucky and Michigan, did not have such ad- 
justments during the period examined. 
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ing strong functional-form assumptions. As 
we indicate in the concluding Section V, the 
incentive effect of the benefit shifts is quite 
substantial. In particular, while we find a 
range of estimates, the central tendency of 
our estimates suggests that a 10-percent in- 
crease in the benefit level is associated with 
an increase in spell durations of 3-4 per- 
cent. 
I. Workers' Compensation Laws 
and the Benefit Increases 
Workers' compensation programs are run 
by the individual states and differ widely in 
their coverage, types of benefits, levels of 
benefits, and available methods of insurance 
underwriting. Workers' compensation pro- 
vides both payments for medical care and 
indemnity (cash) benefits for work-related 
injuries. By far the most common type of 
indemnity payments are those for tempo- 
rary total disabilities. This paper concen- 
trates on temporary total disability claims, 
as do the earlier papers in the literature on 
the duration of workers' compensation 
claims. A person with a temporary total 
disability is unable to work but is expected 
to recover fully and return to work. These 
claims accounted for more than 80 percent 
of the recent indemnity claims in the two 
states analyzed below.6 However, temporary 
total claims account for a smaller fraction of 
total costs.7 Most importantly for this study, 
temporary total claims have no fixed dura- 
tion; their length is determined by the in- 
jured worker, his or her doctor, the em- 
ployer, and its insurer. While not the case in 
the two states analyzed below, some states 
have a maximum duration or maximum 
amount of total benefits. The vast majority 
of other indemnity claims are for perma- 
nent partial injuries. A person with a per- 
manent partial injury is permanently im- 
paired but not completely disabled. 
The selection of the state benefit in- 
creases used in this study was relatively 
straightforward. There were only three large 
increases in the temporary total maximum 
benefit levels in the states and time periods 
included in the NCCI data base used in this 
study. These increases occurred in Florida, 
Kentucky, and Michigan. The Florida in- 
crease coincided with a major overhaul of 
the workers' compensation law, so that the 
before versus after comparisons reflect mul- 
tiple aspects of the change in benefit struc- 
ture.8 Because of this complication, we ana- 
lyze only Kentucky and Michigan. 
The Kentucky increase of July 15, 1980, 
raised the maximum benefit from $131 to 
$217 per week, a 66-percent increase (52 
percent over one year in real terms).9 The 
replacement rate of 664 percent did not 
change. The minimum weekly benefit fell by 
6See Table 3 for a breakdown of benefit types in 
Kentucky and Michigan. We include a larger fraction 
of claims in the temporary total classification than 
other sources because we use benefit type as of 42 
months rather than classifying as permanent all claims 
longer than one year, as is done in the commonly cited 
National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) 
figures. 
7Over the two-year period examined, claims with 
only temporary total benefits accounted for 41 percent 
of all indemnity and medical payments in Kentucky 
and 68 percent of all such payments in Michigan. 
These numbers are based on tabulations from the 
Detailed Claim Information (DCI) data described in 
Section II. The percentages are much larger than the 
fraction of costs typically attributed to temporary total 
claims, since the commonly cited data classifies as 
permanent all claims longer than one year. 
8Florida raised its maximum benefit amount from 
$130 per week to $195 on August 1, 1979, but this 
coincided with a complete reform of the Florida work- 
ers' compensation law. A wage-loss system was adopted 
which eliminated benefits if an individual made more 
after reaching maximum medical improvement than he 
or she had previously. Initial interpretations of the new 
law made it difficult for workers to demonstrate that 
they had certain impairments, particularly those not 
listed in American Medical Association (AMA) guides. 
Many minor permanent partial cases were eliminated 
from the program. The reform also sought to reduce 
the frequency of lump-sum settlements, by not allowing 
them to be considered until six months after the worker 
had reached maximum medical improvement. For de- 
scriptions of the Florida reform see Monroe Berkowitz 
and John F. Burton, Jr. (1987) and LaVerne C. Tinsley 
(1980). 
9The nominal increase in the Kentucky maximum 
was 65.65 percent. Accounting for one year of inflation 
at 8.95 percent cuts the increase to 52.06 percent 
([165.65/1.0894] - 100). 
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60 cents from $44.00 to $43.40. Permanent 
partial scheduled injuries'0 were replaced 
by payments determined by multiplying the 
weekly benefit for permanent partial disabil- 
ity by the percentage of disability or the loss 
in wage-earning capacity, whichever was 
greater (see Tinsley, 1981 p. 54). Only a 
small fraction of claims were affected by 
this change as indicated by the distribution 
of benefit types reported below. There were 
some much smaller changes in temporary 
total benefits on January 1, 1980 and Jan- 
uary 1, 1981.11 
The Michigan increase on January 1, 1982, 
raised the maximum benefit from $181 to 
$307 per week, a 70-percent increase (57 
percent in real terms).12 The minimum ben- 
efit of $144 was eliminated, and the replace- 
ment rate was changed from 662 percent of 
pretax wages to 80 percent of after-tax 
wages.13 The change in the benefit schedule 
was not quite as simple as Figure 1 suggests, 
since benefits depended partly on tax filing 
status and the number of dependents,14 as 
well as previous earnings. Fortunately, the 
natural experiment was not complicated 
since the benefit levels for those in the 
low-earnings group (earnings between E1 
and E2 in Fig. 1), that we use as a compari- 
son group, did not change. This constancy 
was due to a grandfather clause stipulating 
that if an employee was eligible for a larger 
benefit under the old benefit schedule, the 
employee was entitled to that benefit under 
the new law (see Michigan Department of 
Labor, 1989 p. 28). In practice, this rule 
meant that the old replacement rate was 
applicable to people in the low-earnings 
group. The barely noticeable change in the 
mean replacement rate for low-earnings in- 
dividuals discussed. below corroborates this 
constancy. 
One policy that does slightly influence the 
character of the natural experiment is that 
under the new Michigan law the earnings 
level needed for the new maximum weekly 
benefit amount (E3) differed across individ- 
uals depending on tax filing status and the 
number of dependents. Since we do not 
have information on tax status or depen- 
dents, we use a uniform level of $600 for 
E3. At this cutoff point, a single person with 
no dependents would receive a $305 benefit 
rather than the $307 maximum, and a mar- 
ried person filing a separate return with no 
dependents would receive $276. Almost all 
others received the $307 maximum. These 
provisions probably account for the increase 
in average benefits for the high-earnings 
group reported below being quite a bit less 
than the 57-percent real increase in the 
maximum. 
There are no previous-earnings require- 
ments for the receipt of workers' compensa- 
tion, and individuals are covered as soon as 
they start a job. In Kentucky, Michigan, and 
most other states, insurance is provided by 
private insurers and self-insurers. If a firm 
meets certain requirements, it can choose to 
self-insure (i.e., pay the costs of all medical 
10Permanent partial injuries are commonly divided 
into scheduled and nonscheduled injuries. Scheduled 
injuries are listed in the state law where a specific 
amount of compensation is specified. These injuries 
involve loss of an arm, leg, hand, finger, or other 
member of the body. Benefits for nonscheduled in- 
juries are determined by multiplying an impairment 
percentage by a weekly benefit amount. 
1"On January 1, 1980, the maximum rose from $121 
to $131, and the minimum rose from $40 to $44. On 
January 1, 1981, the maximum rose from $217 to 
$233.26, and the minimum from $43.40 to $46.65. 
12The nominal increase in the Michigan maximum 
was 69.61 percent. Accounting for one year of 7.76- 
percent inflation cuts the increase to 57.40 percent 
([169.61/1.0776] - 100). 
13 Kentucky and Michigan differ as to the period 
over which previous earnings are measured. In Ken- 
tucky, the period is the 13 most favorable weeks in the 
52 weeks preceding the date of injury. In Michigan, the 
period is the best 39 weeks in the 52 weeks immedi- 
ately preceding the date of injury. 
'4There were dependents' allowances under both 
the old and new law which caused some very slight 
changes in benefits. Under the old law, dependents' 
allowances raised the benefit for an individual at the 
minimum benefit amount by $3 per dependent, up to a 
maximum of five dependents. Someone at the maxi- 
mum benefit received $5 for the first dependent and $6 
for each of the next four dependents. Under the new 
law, each dependent raised benefits by about $7 at the 
maximum, and by about $4 at the old minimum. 
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and indemnity benefits). In Kentucky about 
one-fourth and in Michigan about one-half 
of all dollars of benefits are paid by self- 
insurers (see Daniel N. Price, 1984; William 
J. Nelson, 1988). In Michigan there is also a 
competitive state fund that offers insurance. 
Our data described in Section III include 
the Michigan state fund, but not self- 
insurers. 
Other characteristics of state workers' 
compensation laws that affect the benefits 
workers receive include the waiting period, 
retroactive period, and the rules on choice 
of physician. The waiting period is seven 
days in both states, which means that no 
compensation for lost work time is paid for 
injuries lasting less than seven days. There 
is a two-week retroactive period in both 
states that provides compensation for those 
first seven days if an injury lasts more than 
two weeks. In Kentucky the employee has 
the right to choose the attending physician, 
while in Michigan the employer has the 
initial choice. After the first ten days of 
treatment the employee can choose his or 
her own physician by giving notice to the 
employer. 
While workers' compensation benefits 
create an incentive for workers to prolong 
their time out of work, experience-rating 
creates incentives for firms to monitor the 
duration of their workers' claims. Charac- 
terizing the incentives that firms face is 
difficult, as experience-rating varies by firm 
size, industry, and state. While summary 
measures of the distribution of incentives 
created by experience-rating are unavail- 
able, some broad generalizations can be 
made. The incentive to monitor claims rises 
with firm size. While small firms pay for 
only part of the cost of additional claims, 
larger firms may pay more than the cost of a 
claim through higher premiums (see Richard 
B. Victor, 1985). The commonly used 
experience-rating formulas (see National 
Council on Compensation Insurance, 1988) 
rely more on the incidence of claims than 
their severity. Claims exceeding $2,000 are 
typically downweighted in the calculation of 
a firm's past experience. Overall, most em- 
ployees are at firms with fairly strong incen- 
tives to monitor the length of claims. 
Claims durations are mostly at the discre- 
tion of an employee and his or her doctor. 
If an employer or an insurance company 
questions the length of a claim, it can re- 
quest an updated medical report and even 
request an examination by its own doctor. If 
the company is not satisfied with the results, 
it can give notice that it is terminating the 
payment of benefits. This action will very 
often lead to a dispute. 
The two states have different administra- 
tive procedures to resolve disputes. In Ken- 
tucky, if the employer and employee are 
unable to reach an agreement on the nature 
of compensation, the parties can apply for a 
hearing. A workers' compensation board 
member renders an opinion, subject to the 
approval of the full board. Appeals can be 
brought to the Circuit Court, and then the 
Court of Appeals. Michigan has a two-tier 
structure for decision-making when the em- 
ployer and employee cannot reach an agree- 
ment. Initial hearings are conducted by an 
Administrative Law Judge. Either party can 
appeal the judge's decision to the Workers' 
Compensation Appeal Board. 
II. Data and Methods 
The data source for this study is the De- 
tailed Claim Information (DCI) data base 
collected by the National Council on Com- 
pensation Insurance (NCCI) (see NCCI, 
1984). Data from ten states beginning in 
1979 are available, with data from six addi- 
tional states available over a more limited 
time period. The data set contains a ran- 
dom sample of indemnity claims from a 
group of insurance companies which ac- 
count for over 99.5 percent of the insurance 
sold in the states. The sampling rates from 
this population of claims are 0.4 for Ken- 
tucky, and 0.2 for Michigan. 
The key variables in the data set that we 
use are date injured, duration of temporary 
total benefits, total medical costs, previous 
earnings, weekly benefit amount, benefit 
type (i.e., temporary total or permanent 
partial), type of injury (body part affected 
and the type of damage), whether the claim 
is settled by a lump sum, age, sex, marital 
status, and an industry code. A report con- 
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taining these and additional variables is 
made six months after the claim is filed, 
then at 18 months, 30 months, and 42 
months after filing, and periodically there- 
after. We use the information available af- 
ter 42 months. The measure of duration is 
weeks of temporary total benefits paid plus 
anticipated future weeks paid if the claim is 
still open. Since less than 0.5 percent of 
cases are open, duration is estimated 
rarely.' 5 Nevertheless, we set the duration 
of cases still ongoing at 42 months equal to 
42 months to eliminate any estimated dura- 
tions. We restrict the sample to exclude 
claims with lump-sum payments since it is 
difficult to calculate a duration and a weekly 
benefit amount in these cases. Claims in- 
volving payments other than temporary to- 
tal benefits and those for which previous 
earnings are unknown are also excluded."6 
To make the before and after groups 
shown in Figure 1 as comparable as possi- 
ble, the upper and lower limits (E1 and E2) 
on previous earnings for the low-earnings 
group and the lower earnings limit (E3) for 
the high-earnings group are indexed using 
state-level average weekly earnings.17 Dur- 
ing the year surrounding the benefit in- 
crease in Kentucky, average earnings rose 
8.94 percent. The analogous figure for 
Michigan is 7.76 percent. 
Table 1 reports some summary measures 
of the change in benefit structure in Ken- 
tucky and Michigan. In both states, the frac- 
tion of previous earnings replaced by work- 
ers' compensation rises dramatically for the 
high-earnings group which received the 
benefit increase, but remains constant for 
low-earnings individuals who are unaffected 
by the increase. A very similar pattern is 
evident for the real benefit amount. The 
percentage rise for the high-earnings group 
in Michigan is not as high as the rise in the 
maximum benefit for the reasons given in 
Section I. Previous earnings and the frac- 
tion of claims filed by males are very similar 
before and after the benefit increases in 
both states and earnings groups. There are 
some changes in the composition of claims 
by industry, but they go in different direc- 
tions for the two states. Since the empirical 
results are very similar when done sepa- 
rately for the three industry groups, the 
changes in composition did not bias the 
results discussed in Section III below. 
Moreover, the regression analysis in Section 
IV explicitly accounts for changes in the 
industry mix. 
Table 2 reports the composition of the 
sample by injury type. The large injury cate- 
gories are a fairly stable fraction of the total 
in Kentucky. Michigan is less stable, with a 
notable decline in injuries to upper extremi- 
ties for high-earnings individuals. Again, the 
regression analysis below controls for injury 
type. 
As the data in Table 3 indicate, the fre- 
quency of the different benefit types for 
high-earnings claims relative to low-earn- 
ings claims does change somewhat, but the 
changes are in opposite directions for the 
two states. In Kentucky there is a relative 
increase in the temporary total fraction of 
claims for high-earnings individuals, while 
in Michigan there is a relative increase for 
low-earnings individuals. A similarly mixed 
pattern is also evident in the frequency of 
lump-sum payments in the two states. There 
is no consistent pattern to the changes in 
claim composition. Furthermore, since both 
of these changes affect a very small percent- 
age of the sample, they are unlikely to have 
appreciable effects on statistics like the 
15By 42 months, more than 99.5 percent of claims 
are recorded as closed in Kentucky and Michigan. 
However, these numbers seem to conflict with the 
claims distribution, which indicates that 0.85 percent of 
the Kentucky claims and 3.15 percent of the Michigan 
claims are at least 42 months long. 
16The frequency of other types of claims can be 
seen in Table 3. The frequency of claims with unknown 
previous earnings was 0.41 percent in Kentucky and 
1.84 percent in Michigan. 
17These numbers are used because they are at the 
state level, have broad coverage, and are available on a 
quarterly basis so they match the qualifying periods 
well. The average wage data are unpublished but were 
provided by Cindy Ambler of the U.S. Department of 
Labor. In Kentucky, the nominal values of El, E2, and 
E3 are $66.00, $196.50, and $298.79, respectively, be- 
fore the increase, and $71.90, $214.07, and $325.50 
after the increase. In Michigan, the values are $216.00, 
$271.50, and $556.79 before the increase and $232.76, 
$292.57, and $600.00 after the increase. 
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TABLE 1 -REPLACEMENT RATES, EARNINGS, AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS DURING THE YEARS 
BEFORE AND AFTER BENEFIT INCREASES 
Kentucky Michigan 
Before After Percentage Before After Percentage 
increase increase change increase increase change 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Maximum benefit ($) 131.00 217.00 65.65 181.00 307.00 69.61 
Replacement rate, 32.70 51.02 56.02 30.01 44.15 47.14 
high earnings (percent) (0.25) (0.37) (1.65) (0.35) (0.48) (2.33) 
Replacement rate, 66.42 66.66 0.36 66.64 66.35 - 0.45 
low earnings (percent) (0.20) (0.22) (0.44) (0.24) (0.30) (0.58) 
Average benefit (1983 $), 151.08 239.09 58.25 220.66 320.48 45.24 
high earnings (0.96) (1.32) (1.33) (1.78) (2.27) (1.56) 
Average benefit (1983 $), 118.58 118.26 -0.27 183.66 182.77 -0.45 
low earnings (0.64) (0.74) (0.82) (0.78) (0.93) (0.58) 
Average earnings (1983 $), 475.31 482.41 1.49 749.72 739.01 -1.43 
high earnings (2.45) (2.73) (0.78) (7.25) (7.49) (1.38) 
Average earnings (1983 $), 179.09 177.54 -0.86 275.83 275.65 -0.07 
low earnings (0.89) (0.97) (0.73) (0.75) (0.83) (0.40) 
Percentage male, 94.39 95.78 1.47 100.00 97.25 -2.75 
high earnings (0.66) (0.59) (0.94) - (1.11) 
Percentage male, 64.36 62.88 - 2.30 73.94 75.58 2.22 
low earnings (1.16) (1.24) (2.61) (1.81) (1.97) (3.50) 
Percentage manufacturing, 15.69 18.80 19.84 36.82 19.72 -46.43 
high earnings (1.04) (1.15) (10.79) (3.12) (2.70) (30.01) 
Percentage manufacturing, 30.71 31.52 2.65 44.69 41.35 -7.48 
low earnings (1.12) (1.19) (5.38) (2.06) (2.26) (7.73) 
Percentage construction, 20.65 16.55 - 19.85 34.73 35.78 3.03 
high earnings (1.15) (1.09) (6.94) (3.08) (3.25) (12.31) 
Percentage construction, 9.29 10.48 12.81 12.33 9.07 -26.42 
low earnings (0.70) (0.78) (12.01) (1.36) (1.32) (24.81) 
Sample sizes: 
High earnings 1,233 1,161 239 219 
Low earnings 1,705 1,527 589 477 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The standard errors for the percentage male in the high-earnings group 
cannot be calculated in the usual way. Wages are in 1982 dollars, indexed using state level average weekly earnings 
from the Unemployment Insurance Service. 
mean of the natural logarithm of duration 
which is examined below. 
One should remember though, that the 
comparisons below will be valid as long as 
any changes in Kentucky and Michigan, 
other than the increase in the benefit maxi- 
mum, affected the high- and low-earnings 
groups similarly. In most of the compar- 
isons, we examine the durations and medi- 
cal costs of low-earnings individuals before 
and after the benefit increases in case the 
changes we observe for high-earnings indi- 
viduals were occurring for all groups. 
III. Changes in the Distribution 
of Injury Durations 
In this section we examine whether the 
length of receipt of workers' compensation 
rose after the benefit increases and whether 
there were comparable changes in the 
severity of the corresponding injuries. 
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TABLE 2-KENTUCKY AND MICHIGAN: INJURY TYPES (PERCENTAGES) DURING THE YEARS BEFORE 
AND AFTER BENEFIT INCREASES 
Kentucky Michigan 
Before After Percentage Before After Percentage 
increase increase change increase increase change 
Injury type (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Head, high earnings 4.38 3.36 -23.30 4.18 2.74 -34.52 
(0.58) (0.53) (15.81) (1.30) (1.10) (33.25) 
Head, low earnings 3.40 4.32 27.06 2.72 2.31 -15.11 
(0.44) (0.52) (22.43) (0.67) (0.69) (32.84) 
Neck, high earnings 2.27 3.19 40.34 2.51 1.37 -45.43 
(0.42) (0.52) (34.68) (1.01) (0.79) (38.25) 
Neck, low earnings 0.88 1.31 48.88 1.19 1.26 5.84 
(0.23) (0.29) (50.58) (0.45) (0.51) (58.52) 
Upper extremities, 23.76 23.51 -1.05 30.96 18.26 -41.01 
high earnings (1.21) (1.24) (7.27) (2.99) (2.61) (10.18) 
Upper extremities, 34.13 33.01 -3.31 33.11 31.45 -5.02 
low earnings (1.15) (1.20) (4.80) (1.94) (2.13) (8.50) 
Trunk, high earnings 12.41 12.23 -1.43 14.23 19.63 38.02 
(0.94) (0.96) (10.75) (2.26) (2.68) (28.92) 
Trunk, low earnings 10.26 9.36 -8.76 11.38 12.37 8.74 
(0.73) (0.75) (9.77) (1.31) (1.51) (18.22) 
Low back, high 28.71 28.34 -1.30 21.34 26.03 21.97 
earnings (1.29) (1.32) (6.39) (2.65) (2.97) (20.56) 
Low back, low 24.69 26.20 6.09 25.64 22.85 -10.87 
earnings (1.04) (1.13) (6.40) (1.80) (1.92) (9.77) 
Lower extremities, 24.98 24.12 -3.45 22.59 27.85 23.28 
high earnings (1.23) (1.26) (6.93) (2.71) (3.03) (19.94) 
Lower extremities, 22.99 21.87 -4.86 19.35 23.69 22.40 
low earnings (1.02) (1.06) (6.24) (1.63) (1.95) (14.39) 
Other injuries, 2.51 4.05 61.02 4.18 2.74 -34.52 
high earnings (0.45) (0.58) (36.67) (1.30) (1.10) (33.25) 
Other injuries, 3.05 3.01 -1.23 3.74 4.61 23.48 
low earnings (0.42) (0.44) (19.69) (0.78) (0.96) (36.45) 
Occupational diseases, 0.97 1.21 23.90 0.00 1.37 
high earnings (0.28) (0.32) (48.48) (0.79) 
Occupational diseases, 0.59 0.92 56.32 2.89 1.47 -49.16 
loW earnings (0.18) (0.24) (64.49) (0.69) (0.55) (22.62) 
Sample sizes: 
High earnings 1,233 1,161 239 219 
Low earnings 1,705 1,527 589 477 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The standard errors for the percentage of occupational diseases in 
Michigan in the high-earnings group cannot be calculated in the usual way. 
330 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JUNE 1995 
TABLE 3-FREQUENCY (PERCENTAGES) OF BENEFIT TYPES AND LUMP-SUM PAYMENTS, DURING THE YEARS 
BEFORE AND AFTER BENEFIT INCREASES 
Kentucky Michigan 
Before After Percentage Before After Percentage 
increase increase change increase increase change 
Benefit type (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Temporary total 
High earnings 83.63 87.13 4.19 88.26 88.69 0.49 
(0.93) (0.89) (1.57) (1.87) (1.91) (3.03) 
Low earnings 85.74 85.97 0.27 87.63 90.10 2.82 
(0.76) (0.80) (1.28) (1.19) (1.23) (1.99) 
Permanent partial 
High earnings 12.06 8.18 -32.17 0.67 0.73 8.76 
(0.81) (0.72) (7.55) (0.47) (0.51) (108.38) 
Low earnings 10.04 9.39 - 6.47 1.05 1.54 45.90 
(0.65) (0.67) (9.02) (0.37) (0.51) (70.44) 
Other benefits 
High earnings 4.31 4.69 8.64 11.07 10.58 -4.42 
(0.51) (0.56) (18.21) (1.82) (1.86) (22.97) 
Low earnings 4.22 4.64 9.95 11.32 8.36 -26.11 
(0.44) (0.48) (16.11) (1.15) (1.14) (12.59) 
Sample sizes: 
High earnings 1,600 1,430 298 274 
Low earnings 2,132 1,896 760 586 
Temporary total, lump sums: 
High earnings 7.85 6.82 - 13.07 9.13 9.88 8.23 
(0.74) (0.71) (12.21) (1.78) (1.91) (29.72) 
Low earnings 6.73 6.32 - 6.09 11.56 9.66 - 16.46 
(0.59) (0.60) (12.13) (1.24) (1.29) (14.28) 
Sample sizes: 
High earnings 1,338 1,246 263 243 
Low earnings 1,828 1,630 666 528 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The benefit types require some explanation: "other" includes combina- 
tions of benefit types, permanent total, temporary partial, and death. 
Table 4 reports measures of the duration 
and the total medical costs of claims in 
Kentucky and Michigan for the year before 
and the year after the benefit increases. We 
report the mean, median, 75th percentile, 
and the mean of the natural logarithm of 
duration.18 We emphasize the mean of the 
logarithm of duration because this statistic 
is likely to be more precisely measured and 
less susceptible to the influence of a few 
large observations. This issue of robustness 
is important here since the distribution of 
claim lengths has a few large values, but 
most values are small. The median in most 
groups is 5 weeks or less, but 2 percent of 
the observations are at least 182 weeks (32 
years). The mean of the untransformed data 
18Approximately 5 percent of the durations are 
recorded as zero (see Table 5) because insurance com- 
panies are instructed to round duration to the nearest 
whole number of weeks. Since these durations lie in 
the interval (0.0, 0.5), we set their values to the mid- 
point of the interval (i.e., 0.25) before taking loga- 
rithms. With this recording, each observation is coded 
to the midpoint of its interval of true values. When we 
add 0.5 to all observations or exclude all zeros the 
results are very similar to those reported here. 
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TABLE 4-KENTUCKY AND MICHIGAN: DURATION AND MEDICAL COSTS OF TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITIES 
DURING THE YEARS BEFORE AND AFTER BENEFIT INCREASES 
Difference 
High earnings Low earnings Differences in differences 
Before After Before After 
increase increase increase increase [(2)- (1)] [(4)- (3)] [(5)-(6)] 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Mean duration (weeks) 
Kentucky 11.16 12.89 6.25 7.01 1.72 0.76 0.96 
(0.83) (0.83) (0.30) (0.41) (1.17) (0.51) (1.28) 
Michigan 14.76 19.42 10.94 13.64 4.66 2.70 1.96 
(2.25) (2.67) (1.09) (1.56) (3.49) (1.90) (3.97) 
Median duration (weeks) 
Kentucky 4.00 5.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
(0.14) (0.20) (0.11) (0.12) (0.25) (0.16) (0.29) 
Michigan 5.00 7.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 0.00 2.00 
(0.45) (0.67) (0.22) (0.28) (0.81) (0.35) (0.89) 
75th percentile, duration (weeks) 
Kentucky 8.00 10.00 7.00 7.00 2.00 0.00 2.00 
(0.28) (0.45) (0.21) (0.24) (0.53) (0.32) (0.62) 
Michigan 10.00 14.00 8.50 9.00 4.00 0.50 3.50 
(0.74) (1.88) (0.54) (0.57) (2.03) (0.79) (2.17) 
Mean of log duration 
Kentucky 1.38 1.58 1.13 1.13 0.20 0.01 0.19 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) 
Michigan 1.58 1.87 1.41 1.51 0.29 0.10 0.19 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.13) (0.08) (0.16) 
Mean medical cost (dollars) 
Kentucky 3,298.96 1,688.67 878.20 1,155.98 -1,610.29 277.78 -1,888.07 
(1,885.93) (116.59) (78.07) (157.26) (1,889.53) (175.57) (1,897.67) 
Michigan 2,229.41 2,585.23 1,538.22 2,017.65 355.82 479.43 - 123.61 
(293.93) (364.76) (188.49) (304.83) (468.45) (358.40) (589.83) 
Median medical cost (dollars) 
Kentucky 393.51 411.49 238.96 254.40 17.98 15.44 2.55 
(19.29) (22.72) (8.48) (9.11) (29.80) (12.44) (32.30) 
Michigan 689.73 765.00 390.63 435.00 75.27 44.38 30.89 
(77.30) (134.53) (32.80) (33.09) (155.16) (46.59) (162.00) 
75th percentile, cost (dollars) 
Kentucky 1,335.71 1,686.40 864.94 867.53 350.69 2.59 348.10 
(103.08) (122.95) (72.24) (69.78) (160.45) (100.44) (189.29) 
Michigan 2,284.60 2,379.00 1,383.93 1,822.00 94.40 438.07 - 343.67 
(178.51) (284.80) (155.69) (145.49) (336.12) (213.09) (397.98) 
Mean of log cost 
Kentucky 6.09 6.24 5.61 5.69 0.15 0.08 0.07 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) 
Michigan 6.56 6.59 5.85 6.10 0.03 0.25 - 0.22 
(0.11) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.12) (0.21) 
Sample size: 
Kentucky 1,233 1,161 1,705 1,527 
Michigan 239 219 589 477 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Medical costs are in 1982 dollars, indexed using the medical-care 
component of the CPI. The standard errors of the median and 75th percentile are calculated using the formula 
reported in Bickel and Doksum (1977 p. 400). The density functions of the duration and medical-cost distributions 
are estimated using a histogram with intervals of 3 weeks and 5 weeks around the median and 75th percentile of 
duration, respectively, and $200 and $400 around the median and 75th percentile of costs, respectively. 
332 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JUNE 1995 
is susceptible to large changes due to a few 
observations.19 
Column 5 of the upper panel of Table 4 
reports the change in duration for high- 
earnings individuals after the increase, as 
indicated by each of the summary statistics 
for the two states. There are large increases 
in the mean duration in both states, but the 
standard errors are almost as large as the 
changes. The imprecision of the mean is not 
surprising in this data set given the skew- 
ness of the data. Similar increases occur in 
the median and 75th percentile of the dura- 
tion distribution. While the standard errors 
on these percentiles suggest that these 
changes are significant, the standard errors 
are only approximate, as they assume a con- 
tinuous distribution while the duration dis- 
tribution is discrete and coarse.20 The mean 
of the logarithm avoids the problems of the 
mean and percentiles: it has fairly small 
standard errors that can be estimated well. 
There are large and statistically significant 
increases in the logarithm of duration of 
temporary total claims after the benefit in- 
creases for the high-earnings group in both 
states. In Kentucky, mean durations rise by 
20 percent and in Michigan by 29 percent. 
Both of these increases are significant at the 
0.05 percent level. 
In case there were events common to 
both high- and low-earnings groups we re- 
port changes over the same period for the 
low-earnings group in column 6, which was 
not subject to the benefit increases. The 
point estimates for the mean of duration 
indicate increases about half as large as 
those for high-earnings claims, but again the 
estimates are very imprecise. The mean of 
the logarithm, median, and 75th percentile 
indicate that the low-earnings group did not 
experience any significant change in dura- 
tion. All of the statistics in both states indi- 
cate that there was only the slightest change, 
if any, for the low-earnings group, except 
for a moderate 10-percent change in the 
logarithm of duration in Michigan that is 
statistically insignificant. 
Difference-in-difference estimates, while 
less precise, can be used to remove any bias 
due to changes over time in factors that are 
common to the high- and low-earnings 
groups. Column 7 reports the change in 
duration for high-earnings individuals minus 
the comparable change for low-earnings in- 
dividuals. These numbers indicate a large 
and significant relative increase in the loga- 
rithm of duration for the high-earnings 
group in Kentucky, with a similar magni- 
tude but insignificant increase in Michigan. 
There are moderate increases for both states 
in the untransformed mean, but they are 
imprecisely measured. The median and 75th 
percentile indicate changes slightly larger 
than those for the logarithm of duration, 
but the standard errors should be inter- 
preted with caution, as indicated earlier. 
These changes in duration do not appear 
to be the result of changes in the severity of 
injuries. The comparability of the claims 
from the year before the increases to those 
the year after the benefit increases is gener- 
ally supported by the numbers on total med- 
ical costs associated with the claims. These 
numbers, reported in the second panel of 
Table 4, show that the high- and low-earn- 
ings groups experience similar increases in 
median costs, probably due to a general rise 
in medical costs.21 The mean of the loga- 
rithm22 and the 75th percentile of total 
medical cost show a relative increase in 
costs for the high-earnings group in Ken- 
tucky, but a relative decrease in Michigan. 
The mean of costs in Kentucky shows a 
relative decrease in severity for the high- 
earnings group. We should emphasize, 
though, that none of the difference-in- 
difference estimates is significantly different 
from zero. Overall, while the duration of 
19For an excellent introduction to robustness and 
the sensitivity of the mean see Peter J. Bickel and Kjell 
Doksum (1977 pp. 369-78). Also see Takeshi Amemiya 
(1985 pp. 70-9). 
20The standard errors of the median and 75th per- 
centile are calculated using the formula reported in 
Bickel and Doksum (1977 p. 400). 
21While the medical-cost figures are indexed using 
the medical-care component of the Consumer Price 
Index, there may be local variation in medical-cost 
inflation for which we do not adequately control. 
22Before taking logarithms, we set all total medical 
expenses less than $1 equal to $1. 
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claims subject to the benefit increases rose 
substantially, their average severity as indi- 
cated by the medical-cost statistics in Table 
4 does not rise.23 
The elasticity of the duration of claims 
with respect to the temporary total benefit 
can be calculated by dividing the change 
in duration by the percentage change in 
the replacement rate for high-earnings 
claimants reported in Table 1. Using the 
estimates for the change in the mean of 
the logarithm of duration in column 5 of 
Table 4, the implied elasticities are 0.36 for 
Kentucky and 0.62 for Michigan. The 
difference-in-differences estimates of col- 
umn 7 imply elasticities of 0.34 and 0.40 for 
the two states.24 These estimates suggest 
large benefit effects on the length of time 
people take to return to work after being 
injured. 
Results from Alternative Methods 
and Samples 
Table 5 reports the change in the entire 
distribution of claim lengths after the bene- 
fit increases for both the high-earnings and 
low-earnings groups. The numbers indicate 
large and significant changes through most 
of the cumulative distribution for the high- 
earnings individuals in both states. There is 
little change for the low-earnings groups, 
though some of the small changes are sig- 
nificant at conventional levels.25 Figures 2 
and 3 graphically display the distribution 
of claim durations for the high-earnings 
individuals before and after the benefit in- 
creases. Figure 2 is the cumulative distribu- 
tion of claim durations in Kentucky, while 
Figure 3 is the distribution in Michigan. 
Both states show an increase in all per- 
centiles of the injury distribution. We per- 
form Wilcoxon two-sample rank tests to test 
nonparametrically whether the injury dura- 
tion distributions are different after the 
benefit increases. For high-earnings individ- 
uals, the test statistics have the significant P 
values of 0.0004 in Kentucky and 0.0240 in 
Michigan. The corresponding statistics for 
the low-earnings groups are 0.9373 and 
0.6170. Thus, nonparametric omparisons of 
the distribution of spell lengths show evi- 
dence of changes in the distribution for 
high-earnings individuals, but no change for 
low-earnings individuals. 
The changes in duration reported in Table 
4 are nearly identical when we exclude indi- 
viduals with injury dates between two weeks 
before and two weeks after the increases. 
We checked this slightly different sample of 
claims in case there was some ability to 
delay reporting injuries to receive a higher 
weekly benefit. The ability to delay report- 
ing might be possible in the case of some 
cumulative injuries. 
A possible confounding factor in any 
analysis of the effects of benefits is that 
higher benefits might induce changes in the 
composition of the population examined. If 
higher benefits lead more people to make 
indemnity claims, then our estimates are 
likely to understate the effects of higher 
benefits on claim durations. The additional 
people who file claims when benefits rise 
are likely to have suffered minor injuries 
with short durations, since they had not 
planned to submit a claim previously. On 
the other hand, the structure of benefits 
might affect transitions from temporary 
total to permanent disability as suggested 
by Terry Thomason (1993) and John D. 
Worrall et al. (1993). The direction in which 
our results would be biased by such an 
effect is not clear, as we exclude permanent 
disabilities from the sample we analyze. 
Since this effect is likely to apply to a small 
number of claims relative to the total num- 
ber of permanent partial claims, there is 
23If there is any bias in the comparisons of medical 
costs, it would likely go in the direction of finding 
increases in medical costs for the high-earnings group 
if a longer duration mechanically means more doctor 
visits independent of severity. It is possible (but un- 
likely), however, that greater medical costs might mean 
better rehabilitation and thus a speedier return to 
work. The regression estimates reported here suggest 
that this effect is not the dominant one. 
24The standard errors for these four elasticity esti- 
mates are, in order, 0.09, 0.28, 0.12, and 0.34. 
25While coarse discrete data make it problematic to 
estimate standard errors of quantiles, the standard 
errors of points on the cumulative distribution function 
are easily estimated. 
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DISTRIBUTION OF INJURY DURATION FOR OF INJURY DURATION FOR HIGH-EARNINGS 
HIGH-EARNINGS INDIVIDUALS, BEFORE AND INDIVIDUALS, BEFORE AND AFTER BENEFIT 
AFTER BENEFIT INCREASE INCREASE 
TABLE 5-CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS OF CLAIM DURATION, DURING THE YEAR AFTER BENEFIT 
INCREASES, AND THE DIFFERENCE FROM THE YEAR BEFORE 
Kentucky Michigan 
High earnings Low earnings High earnings Low earnings 
After After - Standard After After - Standard After After - Standard After After - Standard 
increase before error increase before error increase before error increase before error 
Week (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
0 0.029 -0.025 (0.0065) 0.100 0.006 (0.0071) 0.055 -0.016 (0.0167) 0.055 -0.032 (0.0117) 
1 0.199 -0.031 (0.0121) 0.270 0.003 (0.0108) 0.132 -0.044 (0.0248) 0.172 -0.011 (0.0160) 
2 0.272 -0.032 (0.0132) 0.363 0.002 (0.0117) 0.201 -0.058 (0.0285) 0.317 0.020 (0.0190) 
3 0.394 -0.053 (0.0143) 0.514 0.011 (0.0122) 0.297 -0.088 (0.0317) 0.440 0.010 (0.0206) 
4 0.486 -0.056 (0.0143) 0.599 0.001 (0.0120) 0.397 -0.051 (0.0324) 0.514 0.011 (0.0209) 
5 0.557 -0.049 (0.0141) 0.674 0.011 (0.0116) 0.447 -0.089 (0.0326) 0.566 -0.008 (0.0207) 
6 0.614 -0.068 (0.0135) 0.727 -0.001 (0.0110) 0.493 -0.105 (0.0321) 0.625 -0.013 (0.0201) 
7 0.663 - 0.067 (0.0129) 0.767 - 0.003 (0.0104) 0.534 - 0.094 (0.0317) 0.658 - 0.036 (0.0193) 
8 0.699 -0.066 (0.0123) 0.805 -0.008 (0.0097) 0.598 -0.084 (0.0306) 0.723 - 0.027 (0.0183) 
9 0.729 - 0.072 (0.0116) 0.832 - 0.014 (0.0090) 0.635 - 0.085 (0.0295) 0.757 - 0.026 (0.0174) 
10 0.767 -0.055 (0.0112) 0.851 -0.022 (0.0084) 0.685 -0.089 (0.0276) 0.780 -0.023 (0.0169) 
1 1 0.782 - 0.055 (0.0108) 0.870 - 0.022 (0.0079) 0.708 - 0.095 (0.0263) 0.799 - 0.021 (0.0163) 
12 0.804 -0.052 (0.0103) 0.881 -0.020 (0.0076) 0.731 -0.085 (0.0257) 0.820 -0.026 (0.0154) 
13 0.829 -0.044 (0.0098) 0.898 -0.013 (0.0073) 0.740 -0.088 (0.0251) 0.832 -0.025 (0.0150) 
14 0.844 - 0.038 (0.0096) 0.905 - 0.018 (0.0069) 0.753 - 0.088 (0.0244) 0.847 - 0.024 (0.0144) 
15 0.855 - 0.034 (0.0093) 0.919 - 0.012 (0.0066) 0.767 - 0.082 (0.0239) 0.855 - 0.028 (0.0139) 
16 0.860 - 0.039 (0.0090) 0.927 -0.011 (0.0063) 0.785 - 0.069 (0.0236) 0.864 - 0.026 (0.0136) 
17 0.868 -0.040 (0.0087) 0.933 -0.011 (0.0061) 0.804 -0.058 (0.0231) 0.876 -0.024 (0.0131) 
18 0.875 -0.037 (0.0085) 0.940 -0.009 (0.0059) 0.817 -0.049 (0.0229) 0.889 -0.021 (0.0126) 
19 0.881 - 0.036 (0.0083) 0.945 - 0.007 (0.0057) 0.836 - 0.047 (0.0217) 0.893 - 0.020 (0.0124) 
20 0.885 -0.036 (0.0082) 0.948 -0.007 (0.0056) 0.840 -0.047 (0.0214) 0.899 -0.016 (0.0123) 
21 0.891 -0.034 (0.0080) 0.952 -0.009 (0.0053) 0.840 -0.047 (0.0214) 0.904 -0.013 (0.0122) 
22 0.896 -0.030 (0.0080) 0.957 -0.007 (0.0052) 0.840 -0.051 (0.0211) 0.910 -0.012 (0.0119) 
23 0.903 - 0.026 (0.0078) 0.960 - 0.008 (0.0049) 0.854 - 0.046 (0.0204) 0.914, - 0.008 (0.0119) 
24 0.907 - 0.025 (0.0077) 0.963 - 0.007 (0.0048) 0.868 - 0.040 (0.0197) 0.920 -0.007 (0.0116) 
25 0.910 -0.026 (0.0075) 0.966 -0.004 (0.0048) 0.872 -0.036 (0.0197) 0.922 -0.007 (0.0115) 
26 0.914 - 0.024 (0.0074) 0.967 - 0.006 (0.0047) 0.877 - 0.039 (0.0190) 0.922 - 0.008 (0.0114) 
27 0.916 -0.023 (0.0074) 0.968 -0.009 (0.0044) 0.881 -0.035 (0.0190) 0.925 -0.009 (0.0111) 
28 0.922 - 0.022 (0.0071) 0.969 - 0.008 (0.0044) 0.881 - 0.035 (0.0190) 0.927 - 0.010 (0.0109) 
29 0.923 -0.021 (0.0071) 0.971 - 0.009 (0.0042) 0.886 -0.030 (0.0190) 0.929 -0.012 (0.0107) 
30 0.928 -0.017 (0.0071) 0.971 -0.011 (0.0041) 0.890 -0.031 (0.0186) 0.937 -0.004 (0.0107) 
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unlikely to be an appreciable effect on the 
mean of the natural logarithm emphasized 
above. While a few large observations can 
greatly affect a mean, they will likely have 
less of an effect on the mean of the natural 
logarithm or the median. One should also 
note that there is very little evidence of an 
increase in the severity of the claims as 
measured by medical costs. Therefore, we 
think that any effects of changes in the 
composition of the population examined are 
likely to be small. In addition, we can adjust 
for the effects of changes in observable 
characteristics of claimants. We turn to this 
issue in the next section. 
IV. Regression Estimates of the Changes 
in Duration 
To account for possible changes in the 
composition of the sample after the benefit 
increases, we estimate a series of regression 
equations that control for all of the avail- 
able characteristics of the worker, the job, 
and the injury. Specifically, the estimates in 
Table 6 control for worker age, marital sta- 
tus, sex, industry, and the severity of the 
injury as measured by medical costs, hospi- 
tal days, and type of injury. The specifica- 
tions that we try are the regression ana- 
logue of the differences and difference in 
differences of Table 4. In all of the equa- 
tions, the dependent variable is the natu- 
ral logarithm of duration, measured in 
weeks. In the absence of censoring and time- 
varying explanatory variables, the commonly 
used exponential, Weibull, and log-logistic 
hazard models with and without unobserved 
heterogeneity are special cases of log- 
duration regression. These listed hazard 
models assume particular distributions for 
the error term which log-duration regres- 
sion allows us to leave unspecified. The 
sample sizes are slightly smaller than those 
earlier because of missing variables. In al- 
most all cases the missing variable is marital 
status. 
Two sets of specifications are estimated: 
specifications (i)-(iv), which pool high- and 
low-earnings individuals, and specifications 
(v)-(viii) with only high-earnings workers. 
Variables in the pooled estimates explicitly 
take into account two possibly confounding 
determinants of spell lengths in the sample. 
An indicator variable for whether the obser- 
vation is after the benefit increase ("after- 
increase" variable) removes any effect of 
being after the increase that is common to 
both the high-earnings and low-earnings 
groups. The high-earnings variable and the 
ln(previous earnings) x high-earnings-group 
interaction variable net out any time-in- 
variant differences between the high-earn- 
ings and low-earnings groups. The key vari- 
able to interpret in these pooled estimates 
is the third variable appearing in Table 
6-the interaction between an observation's 
being after the increase and in the high- 
earnings group. This dummy variable is an 
indicator for the group which experienced 
the increase in benefits, and it measures the 
percentage change in duration associated 
with the benefit increase. The coefficient 
has the expected positive sign in both states 
and is significant at conventional levels in 
Kentucky. 
It is important to note that these esti- 
mates are quite similar in size and signifi- 
cance to the difference of the differences in 
mean log duration reported in Table 4. The 
similarity is not surprising since the after- 
increase x high-earnings-group coefficient is 
the regression analogue of the difference in 
column 5 minus the difference in column 6 
in that table. If only a constant and the first 
three dummy variables are included, the 
regression should reproduce this difference 
of differences.26 
For the second set of estimates, reported 
in columns (v)-(viii) of Table 6, we use only 
the high-earnings observations. These esti- 
mates correspond to the difference in the 
mean of the logarithm of duration as re- 
26The standard error will only be the same if one 
allows the four groups to have different error vari- 
ances. There will be some slight differences since our 
regressions assume homoscedasticity and use a slightly 
smaller sample because of missing values of some 
variables. For the key coefficient, the estimate (stan- 
dard error) from the regression with only dummy vari- 
ables is 0.23 (0.07) for Kentucky and 0.20 (0.16) for 
Michigan. 
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TABLE 6-REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR NATURAL LOGARITHM OF DURATION, HIGH- AND LOW-EARNINGS 
GROUPS POOLED, AND HIGH-EARNINGS GROUP SEPARATELY 
Specification 
High- and low-earnings groups pooled High-earnings group only 
Kentucky Michigan Kentucky Michigan 
Explanatory variable (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
After-increase 0.016 - 0.004 0.082 0.003 0.228 0.149 0.244 0.260 
indicator variable (0.045) (0.038) (0.084) (0.073) (0.054) (0.044) (0.136) (0.113) 
High-earnings-group -1.522 -0.594 5.577 3.607 
indicator variable (1.099) (0.930) (4.811) (4.162) 
After-increase x 0.215 0.162 0.157 0.203 
high-earnings-group (0.069) (0.059) (0.153) (0.132) 
indicator variable 
ln(Previous earnings) 0.258 0.207 0.901 0.139 0.492 0.229 0.067 -0.335 
(0.104) (0.088) (0.648) (0.562) (0.163) (0.133) (0.496) (0.414) 
ln(Previous earnings) x 0.232 0.065 - 0.973 -0.587 
high-earnings group (0.187) (0.158) (0.803) (0.695) 
Male indicator - 0.072 - 0.070 -0.303 -0.332 -0.088 0.004 -1.053 -0.489 
variable (0.046) (0.039) (0.099) (0.086) (0.133) (0.108) (0.631) (0.527) 
Married indicator 0.051 0.055 - 0.024 -0.065 0.179 0.112 -0.097 -0.287 
variable (0.041) (0.035) (0.081) (0.070) (0.080) (0.065) (0.185) (0.154) 
ln(Age) 0.252 0.244 0.464 0.481 0.071 0.056 0.796 0.850 
(0.052) (0.044) (0.114) (0.098) (0.092) (0.075) (0.234) (0.195) 
ln(Total medical costs) 0.361 0.316 0.421 0.475 
(0.011) (0.018) (0.018) (0.037) 
Hospital-stay indicator 0.252 0.243 0.191 - 0.279 
variable (0.044) (0.084) (0.065) (0.148) 
Industry indicators: 
Manufacturing -0.173 -0.153 -0.080 -0.126 -0.198 -0.200 -0.055 0.008 
(0.042) (0.035) (0.078) (0.068) (0.075) (0.061) (0.168) (0.141) 
Construction 0.076 0.044 0.448 0.348 0.042 0.035 0.618 0.466 
(0.052) (0.044) (0.101) (0.088) (0.071) (0.058) (0.156) (0.131) 
Injury type indicators: 
Head -0.511 -0.432 -0.734 -0.833 -0.459 -0.335 -1.893 -1.122 
(0.129) (0.109) (0.271) (0.235) (0.200) (0.163) (0.487) (0.410) 
Neck 0.269 0.358 - 0.215 - 0.283 0.333 0.479 -0.874 -0.560 
(0.161) (0.137) (0.342) (0.296) (0.221) (0.180) (0.572) (0.477) 
Upper extremities - 0.163 0.132 - 0.179 - 0.223 - 0.305 0.139 -0.712 -0.161 
(0.101) (0.086) (0.189) (0.163) (0.157) (0.129) (0.366) (0.308) 
Trunk 0.123 0.143 0.087 -0.135 0.064 0.155 -0.488 -0.153 
(0.109) (0.092) (0.202) (0.176) (0.165) (0.135) (0.379) (0.317) 
Low back -0.010 0.185 -0.404 -0.341 -0.082 0.259 -0.848 -0.315 
(0.101) (0.086) (0.191) (0.165) (0.156) (0.127) (0.368) (0.310) 
Lower extremities -0.116 0.184 -0.317 -0.309 -0.138 0.264 -0.861 -0.393 
(0.102) (0.087) (0.192) (0.166) (0.157) (0.128) (0.366) (0.307) 
Occupational diseases 0.278 0.526 0.387 0.353 0.497 0.759 - 2.575 -2.138 
(0.210) (0.178) (0.327) (0.283) (0.297) (0.242) (1.034) (0.867) 
Sample size: 5,347 5,347 1,475 1,475 2,231 2,231 447 447 
R 2: 0.049 0.319 0.069 0.304 0.039 0.363 0.131 0.400 
Notes: The dependent variable is ln(duration). A constant is included in each equation. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. The omitted industry is "other industries," and the omitted injury is "other injuries." The sample sizes 
are slightly smaller than those in the earlier tables because of missing data for marital status. Previous wage and 
medical costs are in 1982 dollars. 
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ported in column 6 of Table 4.27 Since the 
after-increase coefficient is small and in- 
significant in the first four equations, espe- 
cially when we control for a hospital stay 
and medical costs, it does not appear to be 
necessary to control for any effect of just 
being injured one year later. The ability to 
compare directly the high-earnings groups 
before and after the increase is also sup- 
ported by the earlier comparisons of means, 
which show little change in low-earnings 
durations, especially in Kentucky. The key 
coefficient in these high-earnings-only equa- 
tions is that of the after-increase variable. 
Since these regressions with only high-earn- 
ings individuals correspond to a single dif- 
ference, the standard errors are smaller than 
those for the key variable in the first four 
equations. Again, these estimates are very 
close to the analogous differences in means 
of log duration reported in Table 4. Both 
the Kentucky and Michigan coefficients are 
significant at conventional levels, and they 
suggest large increases in duration after the 
benefit increases. 
In all four pairs of estimates, the coeffi- 
cients capturing the benefit increases are 
remarkably similar in the two states, and 
one cannot reject that they are equal at the 
0.05 level. Medical costs, the hospital-stay 
indicator variable, and age are also particu- 
larly important variables in these equations. 
We have reported estimates with and with- 
out these variables because they are our 
best measures of injury severity, but they 
are potentially endogenous. Higher medical 
costs, a hospital stay, and being older all 
lead to a longer time until an injured worker 
returns to work. There is also some evi- 
dence that women have longer injury dura- 
tions. The estimates of the key coefficient 
are quite similar when an indicator for the 
presence of an attorney and the interaction 
of marital status and male are added to the 
equations. Overall, the regression estimates 
are strikingly similar to the earlier compar- 
isons of means, and the results support the 
conclusion that the earlier results are not 
due to changes in sample composition. The 
range of the point estimates of the duration 
elasticities from the regressions is 0.29-0.41 
for Kentucky and 0.33-0.55 for Michigan.28 
Results from Alternative Methods 
and Samples 
We have tried several other sets of re- 
gression specifications that are not reported 
here.29 Quantile regression estimates were 
estimated for the 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 0.9 
quantiles. Quantile regression reduces the 
importance of outliers and functional-form 
assumptions and allows us to examine fea- 
tures of a distribution besides the mean.30 
The estimates are the analogues of the me- 
dian and 75th-percentile estimates earlier, 
but now we control for all of the individual 
and injury characteristics of Table 6. The 
estimates using the pooled sample (the ana- 
logue of differences in differences) show 
generally significant effects of the benefit 
increases on the central quantiles (0.25, 0.5, 
0.75) of duration for both states, while in- 
significant but positive effects for the ex- 
treme quantiles (0.1 and 0.9). The main 
difference between the quantile estimates 
and the log-duration estimates is a higher 
27The estimate (standard error) from the regression 
with only a constant and a dummy variable for being 
after the increase is 0.24 (0.05) for Kentucky and 0.27 
(0.14) for Michigan. 
28The standard errors of these elasticity estimates 
are, in order, 0.11, 0.10, 0.32, and 0.24. The elasticities 
are always calculated by dividing the regression coef- 
ficient for a state by the percentage change in the 
replacement rate for the high-earnings group in that 
state reported in the second line of Table 1. Following 
a referee's suggestion, we recalculated the elasticities 
by using as the denominator the percentage change in 
benefits calculated after regressing benefits on the con- 
trol variables of Table 6. This procedure never changed 
the elasticities by more than 0.02. 
29The tables on which these comments are based 
are available from the authors upon request. 
30The seminal paper is Roger Koenker and Gilbert 
Bassett, Jr. (1978). See Gary Chamberlain (1991) and 
Moshe Buchinsky (1994) for good discussions of quan- 
tile regression and its use in applications. 
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degree of significance for the Michigan esti- 
mates under quantile regression. 
We also tried an alternative sample of 
claims which includes the large number of 
individuals who receive higher benefits un- 
der the new workers' compensation laws but 
less than the maximum (those with previous 
earnings between E2 and E3 in Fig. 1). In 
Michigan, this group is over seven times as 
large as the high-earnings group, and in 
Kentucky it is slightly larger than the high- 
earnings group. These observations are used 
to provide much more precise estimates of 
the elasticity of injury duration with respect 
to the benefit amount. The cost of this 
approach is that we assume a linear rela- 
tionship between the amount of the benefit 
increase and the change in duration. Esti- 
mates with the same individual control vari- 
ables as in Table 6 are reported in Meyer 
et al. (1992) and indicate similar elasticity 
estimates to those reported above, but with 
a much higher degree of significance, espe- 
cially in Michigan. 
V. Conclusions 
The results of this study suggest a sub- 
stantial effect of the level of temporary total 
benefits on the duration of workers' com- 
pensation claims. The Kentucky estimates 
are generally significantly different from 
zero, while the Michigan estimates are simi- 
lar in magnitude to the Kentucky estimates 
but are less precisely measured and gener- 
ally not significantly different from zero. 
The elasticities range from 0.27 to 0.62, with 
most clustering between 0.3 and 0.4. Over- 
all, the elasticity estimates are very similar 
in the two states. These results suggest sub- 
stantial labor-supply effects of workers' 
compensation benefits. Our elasticity esti- 
mates tend to be toward the high end of 
those found in work which does not rely on 
a natural-experiment approach such as 
Richard J. Butler and Worrall (1985, 1993) 
and Worrall et al. (1988). These authors 
examined low-back injuries in Illinois and 
found elasticities between 0.2 and 0.4, de- 
pending on the statistical technique used. 
When they examined data pooled from 13 
states, however, they did not find a consis- 
tent relationship between the level of bene- 
fits and the length of spells. 
On the other hand, subsequent papers 
which have followed our approach and ex- 
amined the effects of benefit increases tend 
to find larger duration elasticities. Krueger 
(1990b) examines a period nine months be- 
fore and three months after a 5-percent 
increase in the benefit minimum and maxi- 
mum in Minnesota and finds elasticities of 
over 1.5. John A. Gardner (1991) examines 
a three-year period before and after a 50- 
percent increase in Connecticut and finds 
an elasticity of nearly 1. William P. Curing- 
ton (1994) examines four increases in bene- 
fits over a 14-year period in New York state. 
He focuses on permanent partial claims and 
finds elasticities near 1 for severe impair- 
ments, but much lower estimates for minor 
impairments. 
We should caution the reader that the 
longer durations that we find after benefit 
increases may not indicate a loss in social 
welfare, as longer recovery times may im- 
prove subsequent health. Higher benefits 
may enable injured workers to complete 
their recovery before returning to work. To 
examine this question, we would like to be 
able to examine health status after an indi- 
vidual returns to work. Unfortunately, such 
an analysis is not possible with available 
data. 
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